| | The problem of a two-front war occupied German military planners since the founding of the Second Reich in 1871. Schlieffen is recognized as the one who proposed a workable solution. In 1940, the German's used a modified Schlieffen plan based on bluff, decoy, and diversions. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]<sup>[[User talk:RobSmith|''CIA v Trump updated score'':CIA 3, Trump 2]]</sup> 19:58, 27 March 2017 (EDT) | | The problem of a two-front war occupied German military planners since the founding of the Second Reich in 1871. Schlieffen is recognized as the one who proposed a workable solution. In 1940, the German's used a modified Schlieffen plan based on bluff, decoy, and diversions. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]<sup>[[User talk:RobSmith|''CIA v Trump updated score'':CIA 3, Trump 2]]</sup> 19:58, 27 March 2017 (EDT) |
| − | Schlieffen's exact words were to "strike Paris like hammer on an anvil" thru Belgium, and the movement of troops thru Belgium were to "brush the English Channel on the sleeze". Once these actions were completed, to rush troops East via rail, an advantage Russian military organizers did not have, to meet the overwhelming numbers of Russians, under equiped, travelling on foot. (Solzhenitsen. In ''August 1914'', says for this army of village farm boys travelling on foot they had only one gun for every three men. Troop strength: German professional military would should have been deployed to Belgium. 175,000; underequiped Russian farm boys, 400,000. It's further been hypothesized Hindenburg's and other members of Junker class decision ''not'' to execute the Schlieffen plan is because they were large estate landowners in the East more concerned with self interest than attacking or defending the urbanized Western sector). | + | Schlieffen's exact words were to "strike Paris like hammer on an anvil" thru Belgium, and the movement of troops thru Belgium were to "brush the English Channel on the sleeze". Once these actions were completed, to rush troops East via rail, an advantage Russian military organizers did not have, to meet the overwhelming numbers of Russians, under equiped, travelling on foot. (Solzhenitsen. In ''August 1914'', says for this army of village farm boys travelling on foot they had only one gun for every three men. Troop strength: German professional military who should have been deployed to Belgium, 175,000; underequiped Russian farm boys, 400,000. It's further been hypothesized Hindenburg's and other members of Junker class decision ''not'' to execute the Schlieffen plan is because they were large estate landowners in the East more concerned with self interest than attacking or defending the urbanized Western sector). |
| | The reason the Schlieffen planned failed is, because it wasn't implemented. Hindenburg & Ludendorf modified it by transferring troops for battles of Tannenburg & Masurian Lakes in the East, slowing the advance in Belgium, and allowing the Brits time to infiltrate troops across the channel. This is what caused the 4 years of trench warfare. | | The reason the Schlieffen planned failed is, because it wasn't implemented. Hindenburg & Ludendorf modified it by transferring troops for battles of Tannenburg & Masurian Lakes in the East, slowing the advance in Belgium, and allowing the Brits time to infiltrate troops across the channel. This is what caused the 4 years of trench warfare. |