Changes

Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan. On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. virtually ending trade between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The decision was made to negotiate with the US into the Fall. The Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carrol Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all plans against Soviet Siberia and looked to the south instead for  resources it needed. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.<ref> Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan. On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. virtually ending trade between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The decision was made to negotiate with the US into the Fall. The Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carrol Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all plans against Soviet Siberia and looked to the south instead for  resources it needed. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.<ref> Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Konoe, realizing the situation with the United States was getting worse, made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]] at Honolulu. US Ambassador Grew in Jaoan was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Konoe's plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to US Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] and urged, "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration.... The opportunity is here presented... for an act of the highest statesmanship... with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific." <ref>Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, l94l. Japan:1931-1941, II, p. 565.</ref> On August 26, Japanese Ambassador Nomura in Washington received an urgent message which expressed an almost frantic desire to arrange a meeting between the leaders of the two countries. The instruction stated: "Now the international as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hope on an interview between the Premier and the President." <ref>Far Eastern Military Tribunal (Manuscript). The Japan Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. August 26, l941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 20.</ref>

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Konoe, realizing the situation with the United States was getting worse, made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]] at Honolulu. US Ambassador Grew in Jaoan was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Konoe's plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to US Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] and urged, "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration.... The opportunity is here presented... for an act of the highest statesmanship... with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific." <ref>Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, l94l. Japan:1931-1941, II, p. 565.</ref> On August 26, Japanese Ambassador Nomura in Washington received an urgent message which expressed an almost frantic desire to arrange a meeting between the two leaders. The instruction stated: "Now the international as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hope on an interview between the Premier and the President." <ref>Far Eastern Military Tribunal (Manuscript). The Japan Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. August 26, l941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 20.</ref>

Since the end of 1940 Ambassador Grew stressed US and Japanese differences "could and would be solved if the proposed meeting between Prince Konoe and the President should take place." <ref>Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1952), II, 1264.</ref> When Ambassador Grew urged President Roosevelt to make a speech at the earliest possible moment in order that the Japanese public would gain knowledge of our true intentions, his "recommendation was not carried out." "Why?" Grew asked: "History will wish to know." In his opinion this gesture "might well have turned the whole trend in Japan at this critical time." <ref> Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1952), II, 1343.</ref> Following the outbreak of war Grew asked the Secretary why Konoe's important proposal had not been accepted. Grew "wondered whether Mr. Hull had been given and had read all of the dispatches from Tokyo." <ref>Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1952), II, 1330.</ref>

Since the end of 1940 Ambassador Grew stressed US and Japanese differences "could and would be solved if the proposed meeting between Prince Konoe and the President should take place." <ref>Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1952), II, 1264.</ref> When Ambassador Grew urged President Roosevelt to make a speech at the earliest possible moment in order that the Japanese public would gain knowledge of our true intentions, his "recommendation was not carried out." "Why?" Grew asked: "History will wish to know." In his opinion this gesture "might well have turned the whole trend in Japan at this critical time." <ref>Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 1343.</ref> Following the outbreak of war Grew asked the Secretary why Konoe's important proposal had not been accepted. Grew "wondered whether Mr. Hull had been given and had read all of the dispatches from Tokyo." <ref>Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 1330.</ref>

[[White House]] adviser and [[KGB]] agent [[Lauchlin Currie]] was unalterably opposed to an American agreement with Japan because it could result in a breakdown of efforts to maintain a [[united front]] against Japan.<ref>Memorandum by Lauchlin Currie to President Roosevelt, September 13, 1941.</ref> The British attitude was generally affirmative with regards to Konoe’s offer. Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, was "firmly of the opinion…it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude." <ref> The Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. October 3, l94l, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part l2, p. 5l.</ref>  Craigie stated to the British Foreign Office "Time suitable for real peace with Japan. Hope this time American cynicism will not be allowed to interfere with realistic statesmanship." <ref>[[Owen Lattimore]], American Political Advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, November 2, 194l, Foreign Relations, 1941, V, p. 747.</ref>

[[White House]] adviser and [[KGB]] agent [[Lauchlin Currie]] likewise was unalterably opposed to an American agreement with Japan because it could result in a breakdown of efforts to maintain a [[united front]].<ref>Memorandum by Lauchlin Currie to President Roosevelt, September 13, 1941.</ref> The British attitude was generally affirmative with regards to Konoe’s offer. Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, was "firmly of the opinion…it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude." <ref> The Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. October 3, l94l, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part l2, p. 5l.</ref>  Craigie stated to the British Foreign Office "Time suitable for real peace with Japan. Hope this time American cynicism will not be allowed to interfere with realistic statesmanship." <ref>[[Owen Lattimore]], American Political Advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, November 2, 194l, Foreign Relations, 1941, V, p. 747.</ref>

With the rejection of Konoe's offer, Richard Sorge dismantled his spy apparatus, confident both of a Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain, and of continued Japanese neutrality towards the Soviet Union. Dr. Anthony Kubek writes this suggests a motive for Communist agents in Washington. If Sorge had penetrated far enough into the Japanese military establishment as he seems to have done, to be certain that a preponderance of Japanese admirals would never fight a two-front war, the Soviet Union might conclude that precipitating an Anglo-American-Japanese war was a means of safeguarding Siberia. <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation continued for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

With the rejection of Konoe's offer, Richard Sorge dismantled his spy apparatus, confident both of a Japanese war against the United States and Great Britian, and of continued Japanese neutrality towards the Soviet Union. Dr. Anthony Kubek writes this suggests a motive for Communist agents in Washington. If Sorge had penetrated far enough into the Japanese military establishment as he seems to have done, to be certain that a preponderance of Japanese admirals would never fight a two-front war, the Soviet Union might conclude that precipitating an Anglo-American-Japanese war was a means of safeguarding Siberia. <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, American Intelligence Chief in the Far East, testified that Prince Konoe "was desperately serious in effecting a last minute understanding with the United States."  There were certain "unidentified" persons in the United States who "were opposed to such an understanding." <ref> Testimony of General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, p. 382.</ref> Roosevelt intimate adviser [[Harry Hopkins]], at this very time, took Currie on as deputy for [[Lend-Lease]] aid to the [[Kuomintang]]. Currie and one of the Hiss brothers were at this time, in daily consultation with Harry Dexter White.

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, American Intelligence Chief in the Far East, testified that Prince Konoe "was desperately serious in effecting a last minute understanding with the United States."  There were certain "unidentified" persons in the United States who "were opposed to such an understanding." <ref> Testimony of General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, p. 382.</ref> Roosevelt intimate adviser [[Harry Hopkins]], at this very time, took Currie on as deputy for [[Lend-Lease]] aid to the [[Kuomintang]]. Currie and one of the Hiss brothers were at this time, in daily consultation with Harry Dexter White.

Harry Dexter White, who was in the habit of preparing notes to the President for Secretary Morgenthau to sign <ref>Communism at Pearl,  Kubek, 1959.</ref>, submitted an appeal to the President:

Harry Dexter White, who was in the habit of preparing notes to the President for Secretary Morgenthau to sign <ref>Communism at Pearl,  Kubek, 1959.</ref>, submitted an appeal to the President:

{{Cquote|Oil -- rivers of oil -- will soon be flowing to the Japanese … To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the bright lustre of America's world leadership… On this day, Mr. President, the whole country looks to you to save America's power as well as her sacred honor….}}

{{Cquote|Oil - rivers of oil - will soon be flowing to the Japanese … To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the bright lustre of America's world leadership… On this day, Mr. President, the whole country looks to you to save America's power as well as her sacred honor….}}

Soviet Russia stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war. Roosevelt-Konoe in agreement would have left Japanese troops as a threat to Siberia, immobilizing Soviet forces as far as the European war was concerned.

Soviet Russia stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war. Roosevelt-Konoe in agreement would have left Japanese troops as a threat to Siberia, immobilizing Soviet forces as far as the European war was concerned.