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Mr. President, I want to explain in language as strong as I can command… No matter what explanation is offered the public of a "truce" with Japan the American people, the Chinese people, and the oppressed peoples of Europe, as well as those forces in Britain and Russia who are with us in this fight, will regard it as a confession of American weakness and vacillation…The parallel with [[Munich conference|Munich]] is inescapable. <ref>White MS, Princeton University. Quoted in ''Communism at Pearl'', Kubek, 1959.</ref>}}

Mr. President, I want to explain in language as strong as I can command… No matter what explanation is offered the public of a "truce" with Japan the American people, the Chinese people, and the oppressed peoples of Europe, as well as those forces in Britain and Russia who are with us in this fight, will regard it as a confession of American weakness and vacillation…The parallel with [[Munich conference|Munich]] is inescapable. <ref>White MS, Princeton University. Quoted in ''Communism at Pearl'', Kubek, 1959.</ref>}}

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Professor [[Owen Lattimore]] of Johns Hopkins University, the United States' special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]], dispatched an anxious cable to Lauchlin Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was also a Soviet operative in the Silvermaster spy organization.<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documental evidence which Hull presented in defense of his position. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref>

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Soviet operative [[Owen Lattimore]], whom FDR appointed special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]] at Currie's behest, dispatched an anxious cable to Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the Silvermaster spy organization.<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documental evidence which Hull presented in defense of his position. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref>

On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Secretary Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape the ten-point ultimatum to Japan. Hull's use of the harsh, demanding language made it appear as an ultimatum. This only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carrol Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> It is significant that in this ultimatum eight of the drastic demands were written by White. In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim  of the Soviet Union in the Far East.

On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Secretary Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape the ten-point ultimatum to Japan. Hull's use of the harsh, demanding language made it appear as an ultimatum. This only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carrol Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> It is significant that in this ultimatum eight of the drastic demands were written by White. In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim  of the Soviet Union in the Far East.