Operation Iraqi Freedom

Operation Iraqi Freedom is largest of several active fronts in the ongoing War on Terrorism. Other fronts include Afghanistan, Philippines, and the Horn of Africa. Operation Iraqi Freedom began on 3 March 2003 with the removal of the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein by a "coalition of the willing" led by the United States and allies including the United Kingdom. An interim government, Constitutional Assembly, and later an elected Parliament and Executive have assumed authority, however sectarian insurgent violence has hindered stability and reconstruction efforts by US contractors and the new government. Iraq's new Constitution strictly limits the emergency powers of the Executive in dealing with civil strife--a post Saddam democratic reform.

Background to regime change

In the post-9/11 analysis to determine discontent in the Islamic world that had produced a flurry of dedicated suicide jihadists, the twelve year old UN imposed sanctions imposed upon Iraq and the resultant humanitarian crisis was one such often cited reason. After the Gulf War of 1991 the United States kept troops permanently stationed in Saudi Arabia to defend against an Iraqi invasion of the Kingdom. In the findings of the the 9/11 Commission Report for example, in a section entitled, The Foundation of the New Terrorism, refering to Osama bin Laden's motivations for his Declaration of War and attack on the United States, the Commission found this,

He inveighed against the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, the home of Islam’s holiest sites. He spoke of the suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of sanctions imposed after the Gulf War

Saddam had taken advantage of corruption in both the United Nations Secretariat and Security Council to revive the Iraqi economy after the 1991 Gulf War through the Oil for Food program, nevertheless few of the intended beneficiaries of these alleged UN humanitarian efforts saw the intended relief. Meanwhile, Saddam kept intact the "intellectual capital" or "know-how" to revive Weapons of Mass Destruction programs which were credited with insuring the survival of the Ba'athist regime in both the 1980-1988 War with Iran, and preventing a US overthrow of the regime in 1991. As the 90s progressed and the millenium changed, Saddams top priority was ending the sanctions, and then a full resumption of operational WMD programs.

Arguments for regime change

The concern which has led to this front on the War on Terror was summarized by Raymond S. Kraft in his "Historical Review of the Iraq Situation" He states, quote: "there is a very dangerous minority in Islam that either has, or wants and may soon have, the ability to deliver small nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons almost anywhere in the world, unless they are prevented from doing so. France, Germany, and Russia, have been selling them weapons technology as recently as 2002, as have North Korea, Syria, and Pakistan. These weapons were paid for with billions of dollars that Saddam Hussein skimmed from the "Oil For Food" program administered by the UN with the complicity of Koki Annan and his son.

The militant Muslim Jihadis believe that a radically conservative form of Wahhabi Islam, should own and control the Middle East first, then Europe, then the world; and that all who do not bow to Allah should be killed, enslaved, or subjugated. They want to finish the Holocaust, destroy Israel and purge the world of Jews. This is what they say.

There is also a civil war raging in the Middle East - for the most part not a hot war, but a war of ideas. Islam is having its Inquisition and its Reformation today, but it is not yet known which will win - the Inquisition, or the Reformation. If the Inquisition wins, then the Wahhabis, the Jihadis, will control the Middle East and the OPEC oil. The US, European, and Asian economies, the techno-industrial economies, will be at the mercy of OPEC - not an OPEC dominated by the well-educated and rational Saudis of today, but an OPEC dominated by the Jihadis.

If the Reformation movement wins, that is, the moderate Muslims who believe that Islam can respect and tolerate other religions and live in peace with the rest of the world, and move out of the 10th century into the 21st, then the troubles in the Middle East will eventually fade away. A moderate and prosperous Middle East will emerge." (end of quote)

What the West decided to do was help the Reformation side win. To do that the West had to fight the Inquisition, i.e., the Wahhabi movement, Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist movements. The battle had to happen somewhere, and since the West could not fight everywhere at once, the West chose to create a focal point for the battle, in Iraq. Mr Kraft went on to summarize what the West did and is doing which is important in Iraq, quote:

(1) We deposed Saddam Hussein. Whether Saddam Hussein was directly involved in 9/11 or not, it is undisputed that Saddam has been actively supporting the terrorist movement for decades. Saddam is or was a terrorist, a weapon of mass destruction, who is responsible for the deaths of probably more than a million Iraqis and two million Iranians.

(2) We created a battle, a confrontation, a flash point, with Islamic terrorism in Iraq. This has focused the battle. The ones killed there won't have to be killed here, or somewhere else. We have a good shot at creating a democratic, peaceful Iraq, which will be a catalyst for democratic change in the rest of the Middle East, and an outpost for a stabilizing American military presence in the Middle East for as long as it is needed.

The Europeans could have done this, but they didn't, and they won't. We now know that rather than opposing the rise of the Jihadist, the French, Germans, and Russians were selling them arms - we have found more than a million tons of weapons and munitions in Iraq. If Iraq was not a threat to anyone, why did Saddam have a million tons of weapons?

The bottom line here is that we will have to deal with Islamic terrorism until we defeat it (or are defeated by it), whenever that is. It will not go away on its own. The history of the world is the clash between the forces of relative civility and civilization, and the barbarians clamoring at the gates. The Iraq war is merely another battle in this ancient and never-ending war. Now, for the first time ever, the barbarians are about to get nuclear weapons unless WE prevent them.

The Iraq war is expensive, and uncertain, yes. But the consequences of not fighting and winning it will be horrifically greater. The history of the world is the history of civilization clashes - cultural clashes. All wars are about ideas. Ideas about what society and civilization should be like. The most determined always win. Those who are willing to be the most ruthless win. The pacifists always lose, because the anti-pacifists kill them.

Today, in Iraq, the stakes are high . . . a world dominated by representative governments with civil rights, human rights, and personal freedoms . . . or a world dominated by the radical Islamic Wahhabi movement, by the Jihadist under the Mullahs and the Sharia. The Liberal mentality is supposed to favor human rights, civil rights, democracy, multiculturalism, diversity, etc. But if the Jihad wins, wherever the Jihad wins, it is the end of civil rights, human rights, democracy, multiculturalism, diversity, etc. Americans who oppose the liberation of Iraq are coming down on the side of their own worst enemy. If the Jihad wins, it will be the death of Liberalism. (end of quote)

Liberation from Ba'athist tyranny

An Iraqi Army unit prepares to board a Task Force Baghdad UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter for a counterinsurgency mission in Baghdad.

After the decapitation of the Ba'athist leadership from the military under its command in April 2003, President Bush said in his address:

• Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. (Applause.) And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country. [2]

Many Iraqis welcomed the American invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and in the preceding months, showed optimism about their country's future. An 'American Enterprise'-'Wall Street Journal'-'Zogby' poll in September 2003 found that "Seven out of 10 say they expect their country and their personal lives will be better five years from now. On both fronts, 32% say things will become much better." Furthermore, in a March 2004 poll of Iraqis, the BBC found that Iraqis have great hope in a stable, unified government for their country, with 80% of respondents favoring a centralized state ruled from Baghdad. Since 2004, the unceasing violence by the insurgents has caused some people (mainly in the West) to refer to the ongoing strife as a 'civil war'.

2007 - Four years into the war, the biggest poll since coalition troops entered Iraq on March 20, 2003 shows that by a majority of two to one, Iraqis prefer the current leadership to Saddam Hussein’s regime, regardless of the security crisis and a lack of public services. It also found a striking resilience and optimism among the inhabitants. The survey, published March 19, 2007, also reveals that contrary to the views of many western analysts, most Iraqis do not believe they are embroiled in a civil war; indeed, only 27% believed they were caught up in a civil war and 64% of the Iraqis still want to see a united Iraq under a central national government.

ABC News (and USA Today) conducted a poll and found that 56 percent of Iraqis don't believe there is a “civil war,” and a British poll determined 61 percent don't believe they're in a civil war. The Times of London's summary of the poll: “Iraqis: life is getting better." A version of the combined articles as posted by The Australian: “It's better than Saddam, say hopeful Iraqis.”

Proposed Baghdad reconstruction Plan

Insurgency

Since the removal of Saddam, the United States has been caught in the middle of sectarian violence between Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. The Shia majority, notably the Jaysh Al-Madhi, have began to attack American and other coalition troops even while the coalition has been protecting the Shia from Sunni attacks. Other Shia groups that have not attacked coalition forces have pursued their own factional aims while relying on the US to ensure Shia majority rule. To many if not most Sunnis, the US is viewed as the enemy because it supports Shia majority rule. As the Sunni interpret Muslim law, only Muslims may rule a Muslim state, and the Shia are considered heretics and thus not fit to lead the nation. Though a minority, the Sunni have traditionally ruled Iraq and view themselves entitled to continue the privilege of doing so.

The Surge

File:Cuncil.jpg

Iraqi governing council as of July 15, 2003

Since the new US-Iraqi offensive was launched in February 2007, anti-government forces have been put on the defensive in their former insurgent strong­hold of Anbar, Britain’s top general in Iraq said (March 2007). The insurgency “didn’t do too well in Anbar . . . Their claims have failed to come to fruition,” he said, referring to the declaration by Islamist radicals that they had established a “caliphate”, or successorship, encompassing much of western Iraq. Lt Gen Lamb said that US and Iraqi forces were recruiting hundreds of police for the first time in towns in the Anbar region and that the forces were working together in shared combat outposts. While conceding that car bomb attacks In Baghdad and a surge of violence in neighboring Diyala had to be addressed, he said that US and Iraqi planners were learning to reduce the threat, establishing an outer cordon around the city as well as barriers, or “point defense” protection around key targets inside. The US military has reported cases in which car bombs have been stopped at checkpoints. In some cases the bombs detonated killing Iraqi security forces, but the casualties would arguably have been much greater had the blasts hit crowded commercial districts. General Lamb, who commanded British ground forces in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 said that multinational forces now had the benefit of four years of experience in fighting the insurgents.

The increasing pressure from US forces with this Surge strategy has caused Sadr and his commanders flee to Iran as The Guardian reported Feb 15, 07, "Senior commanders of the Mehdi army, the militia loyal to the radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, have been spirited away to Iran to avoid being targeted in the new security push in Baghdad, a high-level Iraqi official told the Guardian. "Over the last three weeks, they [Iran] have taken away from Baghdad the first and second-tier military leaders of the Mehdi army," he said. The aim of the Iranians was to "prevent the dismantling of the infrastructure of the Shia militias" in the Iraqi capital -- one of the chief aims of the United States-backed security drive. The chief US military spokesperson in Baghdad said the anti-Western cleric had fled to Iran. US forces were tracking him "very closely", he said.

The Surge is showing signs as a solid strategy which is being used to good effect as Al Jazeera reports that the Baathist terrorists have begun to criticize Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in their article Sunni group condemns Iraq al-Qaeda where it states: "An influential Iraqi Sunni armed group has called on al-Qaeda in Iraq to “review” its behaviour in the country. The Islamic Army in Iraq, believed to be the largest group of former Baathists and army officers fighting Iraqi and US forces, called on Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda leader, to take more responsibility for al-Qaeda in Iraq. “Killing Sunnis has become a legitimate target for them, especially rich ones. Either they pay them what they want or they kill them,” a statement from the group said. “They would kill any critic or whoever tries to show them their mistakes.” Sunni Arab officials have also urged what they call “the real resistance” to disown al-Qaeda and engage in talks with the government to end violence which has driven the country closer to an all-out civil war."

Now, the increasing pressure appears to have caused an actual break in relations between terrorist groups as this April 12, 07 article states, quote, "One of Iraq's main armed groups has confirmed a split with al-Qaeda, according to a spokesman for the dissenting organisation. Ibrahim al-Shammari told Al Jazeera on Thursday that the Islamic Army in Iraq had decided to disunite from al-Qaeda in Iraq after its members were threatened. ".. after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi died, the gap between us [and al-Qaeda] widened, because [they] started to target our members. They killed about 30 of our people, and we definitely don't recognise their establishment of an Islamic state - we consider it invalid." The Islamic Army in Iraq is one of several nationalist groups which opposes hitting Iraqi civilians, but it has carried out high-profile attacks against multinational forces. Al-Shammari said they would be willing to deal with the Americans if certain conditions are met. Al-Shammari said that his group didn't consider US forces to be the main danger in Iraq. "There are two occupations: Iranian and American, and the Iranian one is more dangerous than American because Iran considers Iraq as a part of their country." The Islamic Army in Iraq's statement comes after Iraq's president said the presidential office was in contact with five insurgent groups. Jalal Talabani said on Wednesday that the contacts mark an attempt to bring the groups into the mainstream political process.

Additional progress was detailed in "Corps Commander Highlights Progress in Iraq", Apr 13, 2007, where Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of Multinational Corps in Iraq said there has been progress in the security situation in Baghdad. Three of the five promised U.S. brigades are in place in the city, an additional three Iraqi brigade headquarters and 11 additional battalions have moved into Baghdad in support of the operation. Twenty-six joint security stations in Baghdad are manned by Iraqi army, Iraqi police and coalition forces, as are more than 21 combat outposts. "This continuous presence is making the Iraqi people feel safer and has greatly increased the amount of information provided to the Iraqi army, police and coalition forces by the public," Odierno said. Sectarian murders have dropped in Baghdad, and some displaced families are returning to the city. In addition, coalition and Iraqi forces have doubled the number of arms caches found since the beginning of the operation two months ago. Security forces allow citizens to return to a more normal existence. "Across Baghdad, markets are being hardened with checkpoints and barriers, and merchants have returned to sell their produce," he said. "And Iraqis are busy shopping in the markets of Rusafa and Dura, and there are more projects such as these ... that will occur in the near future."

Positive changes are not limited to Baghdad, he said, they are also happening in Anbar province, where coalition and Iraqi security forces are working with local tribal leaders. "The people of al Anbar are fighting back and winning," Odierno said. "They've effectively turned back the tide of al Qaeda, but there will be counterattacks by al Qaeda." The general said there were nine attacks last week in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province. "During the same week a year ago, there were over 84 attacks," he said. Odierno said he also sees promise in the northern part of Iraq. Coalition forces there have set up 33 U.S. police transition teams to build law enforcement capability in that region. Oil is flowing out of the Bayji refinery thanks to Iraqi security force efforts to protect distribution tankers. Progress continues in the country's south, as well. "In the south, Operation Black Eagle in Diwaniyah, conducted by joint Iraqi and coalition forces, uncovered a headquarters of a rogue element of Jaysh al-Mahdi, with a major weapons cache including materials for IED-making," he said. Even the demonstrations called by radical cleric Muqtada al Sadr on April 9 to protest the U.S. presence in Iraq are a good sign, Odierno said. "This demonstration took place without incident," he said. "It is worth mentioning three points related to this demonstration. First, the government of Iraq allowed the demonstration to take place, unthinkable under the former regime. Second, the demonstrators waved Iraqi flags rather than black flags or pictures of ayatollahs. And third, the demonstrators numbered no more than 15,000, rather than the one million its organizers called for."

Opinion polls

Iraqi opposition to the American presence, both politically and militarily, has gradually increased since 2003. A secret British Ministry of Defence poll conducted in late 2005 found that 82 percent of Iraqis were "strongly opposed" to the presence of Coalition soldiers in Iraq. The same poll found support for Iraqi rebels at 45%, rising to 65% in Maysan province, although a poll by the IRI in March 2006 found 78% of respondents answered that "violence is never acceptable".

Many discount these secret polls because they are biased in how the questions are asked ("Have you stopped beating your wife, yet?") and normally have been taken in the areas which have large numbers of insurgent sympathizers in the population, such as Saddam's hometown of Tikrit. The polling numbers are not included or references as to how this "secret" poll was conducted in the above reference. The lack of open disclosure and the fact that it was used to discount the intelligence to that point which was quoted in the same article as the secret poll as, "The secret poll appears to contradict claims made by Gen Sir Mike Jackson, the Chief of the General Staff, who only days ago congratulated British soldiers for "supporting the Iraqi people in building a new and better Iraq"".. leads critics to conclude that this is not a fair or accurate assessment of Iraqi opinion. Also, the article states, "The findings differ markedly from a survey carried out by the BBC in March 2004 in which the overwhelming consensus among the 2,500 Iraqis questioned was that life was good. More of those questioned supported the war than opposed it." It also contradicts the optimism shown by the Iraqis in the polls taken (March 2007) quoted in the portion above "Iraqi Liberation."

Citing safety concerns and saying the following survey was done by "An Iraqi public opinion research firm with a proven record of conducting scientifically valid surveys" (How long have they been doing surveys - "proven record"? Did they do them for Saddam?) the following University of Maryland survey was also cloaked from public view or scrutiny. Again, detractors ask, "How was the question phrased which was answered by the Iraqi respondents?" (See the Conservapedia entry "Opinion Poll" for further elaboration on the importance of the phrasing of questions, etc.)

A poll commissioned by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes in the autumn of 2006 found that Iraqi support for anti-Coalition violence had risen to 61%. Similarly, a U.S. State Department poll conducted in 2006 found that "two-thirds of Iraqis in Baghdad favor an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops". Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians have fled to neighboring Jordan and Syria since the 2003 invasion.

The rather obvious result which is used to buoy this negative report (cited from the US State Department) that two-thirds of Iraqis would like their homeland free of foreign assistance is too vague a question as it does not answer the question of WHEN. The repeated requests to the UN by the Iraqi government for the coalition troops to remain in Iraq to help stabilize the country and the support of the people for the Iraqi government (and its policies, including keeping the US/coalition there) argue against the meaning of this being that the Iraqi people wish the US to simply leave with their mission unfinished.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Although no large physical stock piles of weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq, the search is not over, and has yielded some results so far. Only about one-third of 36 million captured pages have been examined by a linguist and a summary gist of the document prepared. Many believe the physical WMDs that had been produced prior to the invasion were smuggled out of the country, possibly to Syria, before the onset of the war.

Saddam's General says they had WMD - As FrontPageMagazine.com reported in its article "Symposium: Iraq, WMDs and Troubling Revelations" on May 29th 2006 - "Just recently, Saddam Hussein's former southern regional commander, Gen. Al-Tikriti, gave the first videotaped testimony confirming that Iraq had WMDs up to the American invasion in 2003 and that Russia helped remove them prior to the war. His testimony confirms numerous other sources that have pointed to Russia's secret alliance with Iraq and the co-ordinated moving of WMDs before the American liberation."

According to the Duelfer Report, Saddam used the Iraq Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MHESR) through its universities and research programs to maintain, develop, and acquire expertise, to advance or preserve existent research projects and developments, and to procure goods prohibited by United Nations Security Council sanctions.

Additionally, concerning the 36 million captured pages of documentation, when it was put on the net for public translation, it was removed after they found quote, "detailed accounts of Iraq’s secret nuclear research before the 1991 Persian Gulf war. The documents, the experts say, constitute a basic guide to building an atom bomb." As The New York Times confirmed in their issue November 3, 2006, Saddam had complete plans for a Nuclear Weapon and was in the process of procuring parts when the US removed him. Quote: "nuclear experts who have viewed them say go beyond what is available elsewhere on the Internet and in other public forums. For instance, the papers give detailed information on how to build nuclear firing circuits and triggering explosives, as well as the radioactive cores of atom bombs. Experts say that at the time, Mr. Hussein’s scientists were on the verge of building an atom bomb, as little as a year away."

Additionally, tapes with Saddam speaking on them also surfaced and certain sinister remarks Saddam made on the tapes were translated which showed that he threatened to use WMD on Washington, DC. In the article , "Saddam Translator: ABC Reinterpreted Tapes" dated Feb. 17th 2006, the FBI translator who supplied the 12 hours of Saddam Hussein audiotapes excerpted by ABC's "Nightline" says the network discarded his translations and went with a less threatening version of the Iraqi dictator's comments. In the "Nightline" version of the 1996 recording, Saddam predicts that Washington, D.C., would be hit by terrorists. But he adds that Iraq would have nothing to do with the attack. Tierney says, however, that what Saddam actually said was much more sinister. "He was discussing his intent to use chemical weapons against the United States and use proxies so it could not be traced back to Iraq," he told Hannity. In a passage not used by "Nightline," Tierney says Saddam declares: "Terrorism is coming. ... In the future there will be terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. What if we consider this technique, with smuggling?"

Concerning additional tapes uncovered where Saddam is being briefed by his Son-in-law, Lieutenant General Hussein, ABC News reports his words to Saddam Hussein: "Sir, I would not be speaking so openly if it were not for your excellency's and Mr. Tariq's clarification and statement that we produced biological weapons. We did not reveal all that we have. Secondly, they don't know about our work in the domain of missiles. With regard to the issue of the chemical, sir, ... In the chemical, sir, they have a problem far bigger than the biological, bigger than the biological. Not the type of the weapons, not the volume of the materials we imported, not the volume of the production we told them about, not the volume of use. None of this was correct. They don't know any of this. We did not reveal the volume of the chemical weapons that we had produced. We did not reveal the type of the chemical weapons. We did not reveal the truth about the volume of the imported materials. In the nuclear, sir, in the biological, we also disagree with them. As for the nuclear, we say we have disclosed everything but no. We have undeclared problems in nuclear as well, and I believe that they know. There are teams working with no one knowing about some of them. I go back to the question of whether we should reveal everything or continue to be silent... I would say it is in our interest not to reveal. Not just out of fear of disclosing the technology we achieved, or to hide it for future work...

Another of the documents show that Saddam ordered suicide attacks on the US, which then, within a year, could have become nuclear. In the article "Saddam Ordered Suicide Attacks on U.S. Targets" dated April 6th 2006, it states, "A newly translated document from Saddam Hussein's intelligence files indicates that the Iraqi dictator ordered suicide attacks against U.S. targets six months before the 9/11 attacks."

Also, there was another document discovered proving that Saddam was intending to attack London in this article "Saddam was training terrorists for attacks in London" dated March 27th 2006 - "Among the documents released last week was a translation of a three-page Iraqi Intelligence memo regarding a wave of attacks to be conducted by the Saddam Fedayeen.According to those orders, the Fedayeen Saddam was "to start planning from now on to perform special operations (assassinations/bombings) for the centers and the traitor symbols in the fields of (London/Iran/self-ruled areas) and for coordination with the Intelligence service to secure deliveries, accommodations, and target guidance.""

CNSNews.com reported that an Oct. 4, 2004, report by Cybercast News Service included 42 pages of Iraqi Intelligence Service memos that revealed Saddam's purchase of mustard gas and anthrax as recently as the summer of 2000 and his extensive ties to al Qaeda. Then in June, House Intelligence Committee Chairman Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.) and U.S. Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) released declassified portions of an intelligence report that they said confirmed Saddam's possession of weapons of mass destruction, including mustard gas. The report indicated that 500 such weapons had been destroyed by the U.S.-led coalition since 2003 and that the U.S. and its allies were racing against terrorist groups in trying to control the remaining weapons in Iraq. "It is essential for the American people to understand that these weapons are in Iraq," Santorum said during the news conference.

How many WMD means Saddam had some? - Fox News reported on May 17th, 2004 that a roadside bomb containing sarin nerve agent was confirmed to have exploded near a U.S. military convoy, but the incident was downplayed along with the note that mustard gas had also been found. Quote, "The Iraqi Survey Group confirmed today that a 155-millimeter artillery round containing sarin nerve agent had been found," Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the chief military spokesman in Iraq, told reporters in Baghdad. "The round had been rigged as an IED (improvised explosive device) which was discovered by a U.S. force convoy." Bush administration officials told Fox News that mustard gas was also recently discovered.

Concluding that "the mustard gas was "stored improperly," which made the gas "ineffective,"" these deadly agents were ignored and the view that WMD do not exist remains remains perpetuated. The same Fox News article notes, "They believe the mustard gas shell may have been one of 550 projectiles for which former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein failed to account when he made his weapons declaration shortly before Operation Iraqi Freedom began last year. Iraq also failed to then account for 450 aerial bombs with mustard gas. That, combined with the shells, totaled about 80 tons of unaccounted for mustard gas. It also appears some top Pentagon officials were surprised by the sarin news; they thought the matter was classified, administration officials told Fox News."

ABC News reported on 7/1/2004 this article, "Polish troops find sarin warheads in Iraq" which stated, "Polish troops have found two warheads in Iraq believed to contain a deadly nerve agent. The two warheads were found in early June in a bunker in the area controlled by Polish forces, and they tested positive for cyclosarin, a substance many times stronger than sarin, the ministry said in a statement. Another dozen were found later in June. This finding was updated 2 days later as testing found that all sixteen rockets had initially showed traces of sarin, but were now "all empty and tested negative for any type of chemicals." The article went on to state, "In January 2003, U.N. inspectors discovered a dozen old 122-milimeter rockets that chief inspector Hans Blix described at the time as "designed to carry chemical weapons." Iraq later turned up several more, and all were destroyed. Blix later said he was not sure whether Iraq mentioned them in the 12,000-page weapons declaration it submitted in December 2002.

As for anthrax, on Jan 1st 2004, aim.org covered an article saying of Saddam's anthrax production capability, quote, "Investigative journalist Richard Miniter says there is evidence to indicate Saddam’s anthrax program was capable of producing the kind of anthrax that hit America shortly after 9/11. Miniter (said) that during November he interviewed U.S. weapons inspector Dr. David Kay in Baghdad and that he was "absolutely shocked and astonished" at the sophistication of the Iraqi program. Miniter said that Kay told him that, "the Iraqis had developed new techniques for drying and milling anthrax—techniques that were superior to anything the United States or the old Soviet Union had. That would make the former regime of Saddam Hussein the most sophisticated manufacturer of anthrax in the world.""

Saddam's Links to Al Qaeda

BEFORE the United States went to war to depose the threat of Saddam to its Homeland, in March 2002 and February 2003, CIA Director George Tenet Testified that Iraq had clear ties to Al Qaeda. Coupled with the above statement by the NY Times article that they were only one year from a nuclear bomb and the sinister statements by the translator Tierney, along with the article about Saddam ordering preparation for suicide attacks on US targets before 911, the case for invading Iraq to secure the US from further destruction was both logical and justified.

In February 2003, CIA Director George Tenet Testified That Iraq Had Links To Al Qaeda. TENET: "Iraq is harboring senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close associate of al Qaeda. ... Iraq has in the past provided training in document forgery and bomb-making to al Qaeda. It has also provided training in poisons and gases to two al Qaeda associates. One of these associates characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful. ... I know that part of this - and part of this Zarqawi network in Baghdad are two dozen Egyptian Islamic jihad which is indistinguishable from al Qaeda - operatives who are aiding the Zarqawi network, and two senior planners who have been in Baghdad since last May.

Now, whether there is a base or whether there is not a base, they are operating freely, supporting the Zarqawi network that is supporting the poisons network in Europe and around the world. So these people have been operating there. And, as you know - I don't want to recount everything that Secretary Powell said, but as you know a foreign service went to the Iraqis twice to talk to them about Zarqawi and were rebuffed. So there is a presence in Baghdad that is beyond Zarqawi." (George Tenet, Select Committee On Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Hearing, 2/11/03)

Tenet Testified That Iraq Was Providing Safe Haven To Al Qaeda. SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): "Would you say, Mr. Tenet, that the Zarqawi terrorist network is under the control or sponsorship of the Iraqi government?" TENET: "I don't know that, sir, but I know that there's a safe haven that's been provided to this network in Baghdad." LEVIN: "So you're not - well, you're saying that you don't know if they're under the support - that they are under the control or direction?" TENET: "Yes, sir. We have said - what we've said is Zarqawi and this large number of operatives are in Baghdad. They say the environment is good. And it is inconceivable to us that the Iraqi intelligence service doesn't know that they live there or what they're doing." (George Tenet, Select Committee On Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Hearing, 2/11/03)

In March 2002, Tenet Testified On Iraq's Links To Al Qaeda. TENET: "We continue to watch Iraq's involvement in terrorists' activities. Baghdad has a long history of supporting terrorism, altering its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. It is also had contacts with Al Qaeda." (George Tenet, Committee On Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Hearing, 3/19/02)

As mentioned above, CNSNews.com reported that an Oct. 4, 2004, report by Cybercast News Service included 42 pages of Iraqi Intelligence Service memos that revealed Saddam's purchase of mustard gas and anthrax as recently as the summer of 2000 and his extensive ties to al Qaeda.

The Duelfer Report

In 2004, the Iraq Survey Group, ISG, whose intelligence analysts are managed by Charles Duelfer, a former State Department official and deputy chief of the U.N.-led arms-inspection teams, released what has been called the Duelfer Report. The ISG found "hundreds of cases of activities that were prohibited" under U.N. Security Council resolutions, a senior administration official was quoted as saying. Both Duelfer and his predecessor, David Kay, reported to Congress that the evidence they had found on the ground in Iraq showed Saddam's regime was in "material violation" of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, the last of 17 resolutions that promised "serious consequences" if Iraq did not make a complete disclosure of its weapons programs and dismantle them in a verifiable manner. The United States cited Iraq's refusal to comply with these demands as one justification for going to war.

When former weapons inspector Kay reported to Congress in January that the United States had found "no stockpiles" of forbidden weapons in Iraq, his conclusions made front-page news, as did Duelfer's similarly worded conclusion in his report. But when Kay detailed what the ISG had found in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, few took notice.

Both Duelfer and Kay found Iraq had "a clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses with equipment that was suitable to continuing its prohibited chemical- and biological-weapons [BW] programs," the official said. "They found a prison laboratory where we suspect they tested biological weapons on human subjects." "Reference strains" of a wide variety of biological-weapons agents were found beneath the sink in the home of a prominent Iraqi BW scientist. "We thought it was a big deal," a senior administration official said. "But it has been written off [by the press] as a sort of 'starter set.'" They found equipment for "uranium-enrichment centrifuges" whose only plausible use was as part of a clandestine nuclear-weapons program. In all these cases, "Iraqi scientists had been told before the war not to declare their activities to the U.N. inspectors," the official said.

In testimony before Congress on March 30, Duelfer revealed the ISG had found evidence of a "crash program" to construct new plants capable of making chemical- and biological-warfare agents. The ISG also found a previously undeclared program to build a "high-speed rail gun," a device apparently designed for testing nuclear-weapons materials. That came in addition to 500 tons of natural uranium stockpiled at Iraq's main declared nuclear site south of Baghdad.

How did this happen? According to the Duelfer Report, half of the picture rests with entities outside Iraq. Saddam was trying to end the UN sanctions to pursue his conventional, dual-use, and WMD-related programs. In Saddam’s efforts to influence United Nations Security Council members - namely Russia, France, and China - to end sanctions, Saddam’s ordered the Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to formulate and implement a strategy aimed at these Security Council members and international public opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions by diplomatic and economic means. Saddam also made use of “Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements to generate a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN. His success emboldened Saddam to pursue his reconstitution efforts of conventional, dual-use, and WMD-related programs starting in 1997. Quote: "By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support," the (Duelfer) report said.

The Regime’s authorities devised front companies that had close relationships with foreign government officials who worked to procure illicit goods, services, and technologies for Iraq’s WMD-related, conventional arms, and/or dual-use goods programs. Saddam used the Mukhabarat, or Iraqi Intelligence Servise (IIS) to facilitate importation of UN sanctioned and dual-use goods through Syria, Jordan, Belarus, Turkey and others. Numerous foreign trade intermediaries disguised illicit items, hid the identity of the end user, and/or changed the final destination of the item to move it to the region. For a cut of the profits they smuggled prohibited items to entry points along the Iraqi border. Companies in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen assisted Saddam with the acquisition of prohibited items through deceptive trade practices. In the case of Syria and Yemen, this included support from agencies or personnel within the government itself.

Regime intent

The Iraqi Survey Group in interrogations of Ba'athist officials from the leadership of the intelligence and security services, and Qusay’s inner circle, undertook interviews of Ba'athists in custody. Some detainees’ statements were made to minimize their culpability leading to potential prosecution. Detainees were very concerned about their fate and were not willing to implicate themselves in sensitive matters of interest such as WMD, in light of looming prosecutions. Debriefers noted the tendency to place blame or knowledge with individuals who were not in a position to contradict the detainee’s statements, such as deceased individuals or individuals who were not in custody or who had fled the country, or providing debriefers with previously known information. Some former high ranking officials, such as ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid Al Tikriti (Chemical ‘Ali), never gave substantial information, despite speaking colorfully and at length. Some obstructed all attempts to elicit information on WMD and illicit activities of the former Regime. Others, however, were keen to help clarify every issue, sometimes to the point of self-incrimination.

The ISG's key findings stated that Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a Chemiclal Weapons effort when sanctions were lifted. Saddam and many Iraqis regarded Chemical Weapons as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once already—during the Iran-Iraq war— and contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad. After 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital, or the know-how that was developed during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Saddam indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary to counter any Iranian threat. Starting around 1992, in a bid to retain the intellectual core of the former weapons program workers with know-how, Baghdad transferred many nuclear scientists to related jobs in the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). The work undertaken by these scientists at the MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base. The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program from leaving either their jobs or Iraq. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received significant pay raises in a bid to retain them, and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a bid to ensure that Iraq retained technical knowledge.

The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals. The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program. Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure.

ISG judged, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefings, that Iraq at OIF probably had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months. A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in significant quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its existing procurement networks for sanctioned items. In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dualuse process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed activities, if required by the Regime.

Iraq’s historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the capability to weaponize CW agent when the need arose. Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions, throughout the 1990s, many of which had previously been adapted for filling with CW agent.

Saddam’s Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi officers and included the concept of a “red-line” or last line of defense. Uday — head of the Fedayeen Saddam — attempted to obtain chemical weapons for use during OIF. ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations. The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories of which were never declared to the UN. The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.

The IIS provided the BW program with security and participated in biological research, probably for its own purposes, from the beginning of Iraq’s BW effort in the early 1970s until the final days of Saddam Husayn’s Regime. In 1991, Saddam Husayn regarded BW as an integral element of his arsenal of WMD weapons, and would have used it if the need arose. At a meeting of the Iraqi leadership immediately prior to the Gulf war in 1991, Saddam Husayn personally authorized the use of BW weapons against Israel, Saudi Arabia and US forces. Saddam envisaged all-out use. For example, all Israeli cities were to be struck and all the BW weapons at his disposal were to be used. Saddam specified that the “many years” agents, presumably anthrax spores, were to be employed against his foes. ISG judged that Iraq’s actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrate that the state intended to preserve its BW capability and return to a steady, methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the opportunity arose.

Misreporting the Duelfer Report

As The Washington Times reported in their editorial titled "Misreporting the Duelfer Report" the day following its release, October 08, 2004, quote: ""Gotcha, Mr. President." This was the consensus of the headlines from nearly every daily newspaper yesterday responding to the CIA's Iraq Survey Group report on Iraq's prewar weapons programs. Yes, the report found no stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq since the war began in March 2003. But were these the findings that the report highlighted in the first line of its Key Findings summary? No. "Saddam [Hussein] so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone," the summary begins. "He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted." This hardly sounds as if the Iraq Survey Group, headed by Charles A. Duelfer, thought Saddam was cooperating with the international community.

The article goes on to explain that Saddam was attempting to get the sanctions lifted, targeting the three members of the Security Council - France, China and Russia - and then he intended to use the Oil for Food program "to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development." Then notes, "While the United Nations turned a blind eye, Saddam cheated and committed mass murder in an effort to achieve his goals. To suggest that "containment" could have been sustained without dire results verges on the delusional. There is a very pertinent lesson in the Duelfer report; too bad no one told the headline writers."

Threat Level Concern

It is worth noting the following concerning a current controversy about the level of threat Saddam posed. If you consider the terrorists as various minority factions all working toward the same goal, as stated by Mr. Kraft on this page when he says, "there is a very dangerous minority in Islam that either has, or wants and may soon have, the ability to deliver small nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons almost anywhere in the world, unless they are prevented from doing so." It doesn't matter which of these factions would have been used to specifically target the civilized world in a nuclear or biological/chemical attack. Although recently the extent of Saddam's ties to one specific group (the Al-Qaeda terrorists) has been questioned and a recent article stated that the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda figures had only limited contacts, the same article goes on to say concerning Al-Qaeda that "it lacked evidence of a long-term relationship like the ones Iraq had forged with other terrorist groups." Therefore, it is known that Saddam had forged long term relationships with known terrorist GROUPS (plural) and so it was not that there was no threat from any terrorists groups, just that the threat would have come from those OTHER terrorists as the threat to the collective security of the civilized world if the US hadn't taken out Saddam.

It also remains to be seen if the ties with Al-Qaeda would have remained "limited" if that group had stepped up and volunteered to take the completed nuclear weapons from Saddam (which he would have had within a year according to The New York Times - see the WMD section, this page) into Washington and detonate them using sophisticated and existing sleeper cell suicide bombers as Saddam was contemplating. It appears likely that Saddam would have listened and handed them his stocks of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons by his statements (see Mr. Tierney's translation on this page). From his past actions, Saddam was an equal opportunity employer for all the terrorist groups.. including those they admit in this report with whom he had "long-term relationships." As Mr. Kraft observes, it is many "barbarians" at our gates with sophisticated weapons of mass destruction for the first time, not only one group (Al-Qaeda.) It is global in scope, hence the reason for calling this a "Global War on Terror" not a "War on Terror in Iraq." As such, it is a fight for world supremacy, and the civilized world would do well not to ignore or minimize what the civilized world is fighting over.

Accusations of Cover-Ups

While both parties continue to squabble over the above documents and claims, quote, "Both Republicans and Democrats charged the other side was trying using the release of more information for its political purposes," there were others who claimed there were cover-ups happening to stop further evidence becoming public. A NYsun article states, "A former special investigator for the Pentagon during the Iraq war said he found four sealed underground bunkers in southern Iraq that he is sure contain stocks of chemical and biological weapons. But when he asked American weapons inspectors to check out the sites, he was rebuffed. Between March and July 2003, Mr. Gaubatz was taken by (his) sources to four locations - three in and around Nasiriyah and one near the port of Umm Qasr, where he was shown underground concrete bunkers with the tunnels leading to them deliberately flooded. In each case, he was told the facilities contained stocks of biological and chemical weapons, along with missiles whose range exceeded that mandated under U.N. sanctions. But because the facilities were sealed off with concrete walls, in some cases up to 5 feet thick, he did not get inside. He filed reports with photographs, exact grid coordinates, and testimony from multiple sources. And then he waited for the Iraq Survey Group to come to the sites. "I have no doubts the sites were never exploited by ISG. We agents begged and begged for weeks and months to get ISG to respond to the sites with the proper equipment," Mr. Gaubatz said in a telephone interview. "An adequate search would have required heavy equipment to uncover the concrete, and additional equipment to drain the water." Mr. Gaubatz would not disclose the names of his Iraqi sources, but he said they were "highly credible" by his supervisors.

In the exhaustive search for WMDs in Iraq, CNN has left all stones unturned - or have they? These are the words right out of the mouth of CNN reporter Jane Arraf , quote: "And if you had a bureau there, like we did, and it was a known bureau and a known company like CNN was, it was a beacon for everybody. It was a beacon for Iraqis who believed they had stories. Iraqis would show up, there would be Iraqis lined up outside the door. There... would be the Iraqis who told you they had nuclear documents in their basement and would you like to come and look [laughter]. You know, there was almost that pang when you turned somebody away, [you were] thinking, “Damn, maybe this guy really does have nuclear weapons in his basement, but I don’t have time.” So you never really knew."

Costs

(Needs more statistics) Since the war is not yet over, the total cost has yet to be tallied. However, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the war has, as of 3/12/2007, cost less than $400 Billion. The National Priorities Project, though, indicates that the war costs some $195,000 per minute, according to numbers based on Congressional appropriations, and the tally had reached $412.8 billion as of 3/30/2007.

Casualties

Former U.S. Attorney General in the Johnson Administration, Ramsey Clark, wrote the UN Security Council on 29 July 29 2002 claiming UN sanctions , "are the direct cause of the very cruel deaths of more than a million people" A 1999 UNICEF Report stated that there were, at that time, 500,000 deaths of children under the age of five probably attributable to the U.N. sanctions.

Coalition Troops

According to the US Department of Defense, over 3,300 U.S., and over 260 troops from coalition countries have died in the war. Over 24,000 U.S. troops have been wounded in combat.

Enemy Casualties

Larry Schweikart, Professor of History at the University of Dayton, a military historian, has calculated that, "a low estimate is that we have removed from the order of battle about 210,000 on the low end to 360,000 on the high end. This is an entire generation of jihadists, and will, if nothing else, significantly feminize Muslim society."

Civilian Casualties

Estimates of civilian casualties vary. According to Fox News, March 20, 2007, over 54,000 civilians have been killed in the war. However, due to suicide bombings and other such activity, the fatalities caused by US/Coalition forces in action was only 31 percent of the total number given according to CNN's report October 2006, down from 32 percent quoted by this Boston Globe report dated December 19, 2005. In the Fox News study, that would mean 16,740 of the 54,000 casualties.

External links

• Iraq Weekly Status Report U.S. Department of State.
• CENTCOM Home page.