Essay: Vladimir Putin is a corrupt kleptocrat and an authoritarian

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Vladimir Putin

One the most basic traditional values is not stealing. As far as the traditional value of not stealing, Vladimir Putin doesn't practice this aspect of social conservatism.

The conservative thinktank, the Hudson Institute, has a good video on Putin's kleptocracy: Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (Karen Dawisha, an American political scientist and writer, is the speaker) .

Alexander J. Motyl's article at The Hill stated regarding Vladimir Putin's presidency and corruption:

“ Russia has been in disarray for 30 years. True, the Boris Yeltsin years in the 1990s were especially difficult, but Putin has decidedly failed to build a cohesive society and functioning economy. A repressed society may be more pliant, but it is not cohesive and stable, as the Soviets learned during perestroika.

A dirigiste economy may enable the authorities to funnel resources toward whichever projects they want, but it is not therefore more functional. Putin did succeed in building a stronger regime and state, but even that success has been deceptive. It’s clear now that strengthening the forces of coercion while permitting the bureaucracy to run roughshod and seize rents is no way to promote state strength, but it is an excellent way to promote corruption and self-enrichment.[1]

”

Russia has a long history of corruption. Putin's corruption is not some surprising fact of history. See: Corruption in Russia: A Historical Perspective

Panama Papers, corruption and Putin associates

Vladimir Putin's cozy relationship with organized crime in Russia

Vladimir Putin at a conference.

A review of Mark Galeotti's 2018 book The Vory: Russia’s Super Mafia by Yale University Press indicates:

“ The vory, the professional elite of Russian organized crime, have roots that go far back into the days of the tsars...

...as the Russian state began to reassert its authority under Putin, members of organized crime became less important than the oligarchs whom they had helped ascend to wealth and power. Today, Putin controls the oligarchs, and together they control and exploit the criminal world to their mutual advantage.

Galeotti’s work excels at providing an understanding of Russian criminality at its operational level. It focuses on the different types of personnel represented in the crime groups — the bosses, the lookouts, and the aspirants seeking to share in the excitement and the profit of the criminal world. In contrast to the greyness that characterized Soviet life, the world of the blatnye, as conveyed by Galeotti, was vibrant, not reined in by the constraints that dominated the Soviet era. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the criminal world was so often romanticized in the Russian and Soviet imagination. One need think no farther than the Odessa Tales of the great author Isaak Babel, who, as Galeotti recalls, brought to life the crime-dominated Moldavanka neighborhood in the colorful port city on the Black Sea.

A particular strength of the book is Galeotti’s ability to analyze the dynamics of the diverse criminal gangs that comprise the thieves’ world in different urban centers — such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Ekaterinburg. Many operated on a smaller scale in numerous other cities across Russia and Ukraine. Ethnic groups, particularly from the Caucasus, were key actors in the professional criminal world of the Soviet and post-Soviet era. The most prominent of these were the Chechens and the Georgians, both overrepresented in the highest ranks of the criminal world and both meriting their own chapter in The Vory.[2]

”

The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies review of Mark Galeotti's book The Vory: Russia’s Super-Mafia states:

“ Galeotti makes a strong case for the presence of a vory logic in current Russian state practices – look at how the "raiding" of businesses is conducted with state agents using tactics reminiscent of the mob; the state uses criminals to fight its wars in Ukraine and do its dirty business in Spain; Putin uses the language of the street to assert his credentials; taxi drivers listen to shanson, prison music, on the radio; films about honourable criminals and gangs gain cult followings; and young men spatter vory jargon into their speech. The book, especially in the later chapters, provides up to date, thorough and thought-provoking analyses of important events. It is a comprehensive account of an argument that has been touched on before but has never been so well articulated. Svetlana Stephenson’s 2015 Gangs of Russia, for example, ends by noting the infusion of gang logics and language into Russian politics. Anton Oleinik (Organized Crime, Prison and Post-Soviet Society 2003) also argued that post-Soviet society mirrored the "small society" of criminal subculture and the norms originating in Russian prison. Here, though, this argument gets its fullest and most convincing airing yet.

Indeed, Galeotti takes it even further. He suggests not just state practices but even Russian social values have become suffused with the norms of organized crime. "Maybe…it is not that the vory have disappeared so much as that everyone is now a vor, and the vorovskoi mir [thieves’ world] ultimately won (p. 222)".[3]

”

The Moscow Times notes concerning Galeotti’ book The Vory: Russia’s Super Mafia:

“ Russian gangsters, Galeotti writes, “hold up a dark mirror to Russian society” in which the boundaries between crime, business and politics are “all too often indistinct.” The book’s central contention is that these gangsters “have not only been shaped by a changing Russia, they have also shaped it.”

Since the end of the 1990s, Russian organised crime has become “regularised, corporately minded and integrated with elements of the state.” If you follow Russian politics, chances are that you have seen the now famous clip of President Putin threatening to “‘whack terrorists, even in the outhouse.” That Putin publicly deployed these terms, Galeotti says, is only possible because of the widescale appropriation of the underworld lexicon by mainstream society. Krysha (roof, i.e., protection), skhodki (meetings), and limonki (little lemons, i.e., one million rubles) are just a few examples of underworld vocabulary – and, indeed, practices – that have become part of everyday political parlance in Russia.

Another central premise of the book is that where there is demand, organised crime supplies. In most cases the demand is for illegal and often violent services, but Galeotti also tells the lighter tale of “cheese runners” who smuggle Western cheese – forbidden by Russian counter-sanctions – into the country through Belarus. If 20 years ago organized crime was “a facilitator within Russia’s still unruly business environment,” today it plays a similar role on a transnational scale. [4]

”

Russia: The mafia as the state

Videos on Vladimir Putin's corrupt kleptocracy

  • Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?, Tales of corruption in Russia are nothing new. But in her new book, “Putin’s Kleptocracy,” Karen Dawisha connects the dots between government and private sector corruption and Vladimir Putin’s rapid rise to power, leading to the question, who owns Russia?

Recommended books on Vladimir Putin's kleptocracy

  • Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? by Karen Dawisha, Simon & Schuster; Reprint edition (September 22, 2015)
  • Russia's Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy by Anders Aslund, Yale University Press; Illustrated edition (May 21, 2019)
  • The Vory: Russia's Super Mafia by Mark Galeotti, Yale University Press; Illustrated edition (May 22, 2018)

Critical reception of Karen Dawisha's book Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?

Putin's Kleptocracy Who Owns Russia? by Karen Dawisha has been called an "unblinking scholarly exposé"[5] exhibiting "admirable relentlessness",[6] in which "the power of her argument is amplified by the coolness of her prose".[7]

Book review of Karen Dawisha's book Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?

Vladimir Putin and authoritarianism

See also: What drives Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin?

Vladimir Putin and electoral authoritarianism

Putin lays a wreath a the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on the anniversary of the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

A description of the book Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes by Vladimir Gel'man which is published by the University of Pittsburg Press states:

“ Russia today represents one of the major examples of the phenomenon of “electoral authoritarianism” which is characterized by adopting the trappings of democratic institutions (such as elections, political parties, and a legislature) and enlisting the service of the country’s essentially authoritarian rulers. Why and how has the electoral authoritarian regime been consolidated in Russia? What are the mechanisms of its maintenance, and what is its likely future course? This book attempts to answer these basic questions.

Vladimir Gel’man examines regime change in Russia from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the present day, systematically presenting theoretical and comparative perspectives of the factors that affected regime changes and the authoritarian drift of the country. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s national political elites aimed to achieve their goals by creating and enforcing of favorable “rules of the game” for themselves and maintaining informal winning coalitions of cliques around individual rulers. In the 1990s, these moves were only partially successful given the weakness of the Russian state and troubled post-socialist economy. In the 2000s, however, Vladimir Putin rescued the system thanks to the combination of economic growth and the revival of the state capacity he was able to implement by imposing a series of non-democratic reforms. In the 2010s, changing conditions in the country have presented new risks and challenges for the Putin regime that will play themselves out in the years to come.[8]

”

The abstract for the 2018 journal article Regional elections in Russia: instruments of authoritarian legitimacy or instability? states:

“ This study examines three rounds of regional assembly and gubernatorial elections in Russia that took place in September 2015, 2016 and 2017. In particular, it examines the ways in which the regime has manipulated the elections to guarantee the victory of United Russia. The study shows that the Kremlin has adopted a new electoral strategy. Rather than engaging in the risky business of outright fraud during the vote count, which was an important factor in sparking mass protests against the regime, in the wake of the 2011 elections to the State Duma, the authorities have decided to concentrate their efforts on preventing opposition parties and candidates from registering for the elections. Whilst other forms of electoral malpractice have continued to be practiced, such as coercing or bribing voters to turn out and vote for United Russia, promoting “carousel voting” (multiple voting by groups of mobilised citizens), or ballot stuffing, much more focus has been paid in these elections on manipulating the registration process in favour of United Russia. As is clearly demonstrated, scores of opposition candidates and party lists, have been prevented from competing because of problems with their registration documents. However, whilst this strategy has helped United Russia win large majorities in all of the gubernatorial and assembly elections, it has also created lacklustre and predictable contests, and this in turn has led to a sharp decline in turnout, particularly in the gubernatorial elections. There is a real danger that these low levels of turnout may gradually erode the legitimacy of United Russia, embolden the opposition, and threaten the stability of the regime.[9] ”

Vladimir's Putin's propaganda machine

The below videos provide information on Vladimir Putin's propaganda machine:

Critics of Vladimir Putin have often died under suspicious circumstances and he has shut down press outlets that are critical of him. Protestors of the Russia-Ukraine War have been arrested

Joseph Stalin's atheistic regime killed tens of millions of people.

Also, click on these Google searches which show a lot of relevant results: Vladimir Putin kills opponents and Vladimir Putin shut down press outlets in Russia

Vladimir Putin is a ruthless dictator, but admittedly he is not as bad as Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin or the Chinese Communist Party. For example, he is letting people flee Russia with their money - even many men who are fleeing the country due to Russia calling up reservists. And Russia is a freer and better country to live in than China.

As noted in my previous essays, Ukraine is not considered to be a democracy for various good reasons. It is a hybrid regime and in a recent democracy index it was ranked 92 which is low, but Russia was ranked even lower at 144.[10]

Gun rights and Russia

See: Do you strongly believe in gun rights? Don't move to Russia!

Compared to the United States and Switzerland, Russia has significantly lower gun rights.

Why did Putin invade Ukraine? A theory of degenerate autocracy

Vladimir Putin's foolish decision to launch an invasion of Ukraine in February 2022

Russian defector reveals that a 'majority' of people inside the Kremlin are unhappy with the war in Ukraine

See also: Are the Russians as unhappy as they claim they are?


The Grand Kremlin Palace is a building in the Moscow Kremlin.

The Moscow Kremlin is a fortified complex in the center of Moscow. The Moscow Kremlin now serves as the official residence of the Russian president and as a museum.

The Russian army and corruption

See also: The Russian Army compared to the Israeli army. Why is the Israeli army so outstanding?

The article Russian military’s corruption quagmire states about the war in Ukraine:

“ On the operational level, the corruption in defense procurement has also likely undermined logistics, manifesting in soldiers receiving inadequate equipment and supplies on the ground. Poor logistics slows down the advancement of troops, undermines their morale and hinders military effectiveness.

Early on in the invasion, there were accounts indicating that some Russian soldiers received rations that had expired in 2015. Most companies responsible for providing food to the Russian military are connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin — the patron of PMC Wagner, the mercenary organization, and sponsor of the Internet Research Agency, which has been accused of meddling in the United States elections. Several years ago, Prigozhin’s companies were accused by Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny of forming a cartel and gaming the state’s bidding system for defense orders, receiving contracts for several hundred million dollars. The quality of food and housing in the Russian military is reportedly worse than in its prisons, with unreasonably small meals and some carrying harmful Escherichia coli bacteria.

There are also reports that Russian advances in Ukraine were slowed by lack of fuel — and this in a country rich with oil and gas. But ineffective control over fuel consumption in the Russian military actually long preceded the war in Ukraine and had historically created opportunities for embezzlement — that is why fuel is often called the Russian military’s “second currency.” It is plausible that the long-standing tradition of corruption in fuel supply decreased the pace of Russian advancement in Ukraine.[11]

”

Recommended articles:

See also

User Conservative's international relations essays

External links

References

  1. ↑ The Ukraine War might really break up the Russian Federation by Alexander J. Motyl, The Hill, 2023
  2. ↑ A TANGLED WEB: ORGANIZED CRIME AND OLIGARCHY IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA, A review of Mark Galeotti's 2018 book The Vory: Russia’s Super Mafia by Yale University Press
  3. ↑ Mark Galeotti, The Vory: Russia’s Super-Mafia, a review by the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies
  4. ↑ Mark Galeotti: ‘The Vory: Russia’s Super Mafia’, Moscow Times, 2019
  5. ↑ "Putin's Reaction To Sanctions Is Destroying The Economy And China Won't Help". Forbes. October 14, 2014."
  6. ↑ Anne Applebaum, (December 18, 2014). "How He and His Cronies Stole Russia". The New York Review of Books.
  7. ↑ "A book too far". The Economist. April 3, 2014
  8. ↑ Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes By Vladimir Gel'man
  9. ↑ Regional elections in Russia: instruments of authoritarian legitimacy or instability? by Cameron Ross, Palgrave Communications volume 4, Article number: 75 (2018) https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0137-1
  10. ↑ Ranking of Countries by Quality of Democracy
  11. ↑ Russian military’s corruption quagmire, Politico, 2022
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