Mykhailo Drapaty
Mykhailo Drapaty, commonly known amongt Ukrainian troops as Hashish Man,[1] was appointed commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on July 22, 2026 by Ukrainian dictator Volodymyr Zelensky. Drapaty has been on the wanted list in Russia, according to data from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Drapaty is reported to be close to the Azovites, opposed to Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, much-beloved by the Western media and the ‘liberal’ Ukrainians who support Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and hate Syrsky.
Previously, the Investigative Committee of Russia (SK) had filed charges against Drapaty in absentia. According to the agency, in 2017 and 2019, he, along with Viktor Nikolyuk, exercised overall command of the operation of the Ukrainian Joint Forces. Under their leadership, Ukrainian militants carried out more than 70 shelling attacks on populated areas in the DPR and LPR, resulting in the deaths and injuries of 154 civilians.
Russian state media and military bloggers characterize Drapatyi as a hardline “Nazi” and “Russophobe” who harbors a consistent animosity toward Russia.
Russian war correspondents and bloggers heavily circulate archival video footage of Drapatyi from Mariupol in the spring of 2014, presenting it as core evidence of his hostile stance. These commentators argue that his past actions demonstrate a permanent hostility, asserting he will operate without moral constraints in combat.
Russian authorities allege that Ukrainian forces under Drapatyi conducted more than 70 strikes on Russian-occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk between 2014 and 1919.
Accusations of Russophobia, cruelty, incompetence
Following the appointment of Mykhailo Drapatyi as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Russian state media, law enforcement bodies, and military bloggers formalized specific accusations focusing on his background.
Russian Telegram channels state that “he hates us—and hates consistently,” framing his ideological drive not just as strategic opposition but as personal, deep-seated hatred.
The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation leveled formal criminal charges against Drapatyi in absentia, alleging that forces under his command intentionally targeted residential areas. Russian law enforcement explicitly attributes 154 civilian casualties (both killed and wounded) in the Russian-occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to military operations directed by Drapatyi between 2017 and 2019. Russian state media reports assert that he personally authorized and coordinated more than 70 prohibited artillery and missile strikes against populated non-military zones.
To back up their criminal charges against Mykhailo Drapatyi, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (SKR) and Russian state media put forward a specific set of administrative evidence, forensic claims, and field data. Because the trials are conducted in absentia (in the defendant’s absence), the Russian legal system relies on material compiled from local proxy authorities and military tracking.
Russian bodies present the following primary items as “proof”:
1. Military Command Logs and Operational OrdersChain of Command Documentation:
The Investigative Committee cites captured or monitored operational logs establishing that Drapatyi held direct command over the 58th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade (starting in 2016) and later co-led the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) alongside Viktor Nikolyuk between 2017 and 2019.
Authorization Proof:
Russian prosecutors present these deployment registries as legal proof that any artillery, mortar, or missile systems firing from Ukrainian positions during those dates were executing his direct tactical orders.
2. Fragmentation and Ballistic Material Shell Fragments: Local investigators from the Russian-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk claim to have recovered specific shell and rocket fragments from craters in residential impact zones
Caliber Verification:
Russian state outlets state that forensics on these fragments match heavy weapon calibers prohibited by the Minsk Agreements (such as 122mm and 152mm artillery). They present this ballistic tracking to legally tie the weapon types directly back to the specific Ukrainian brigades Drapatyi was commanding at the time.
3. Impact Registry and Damage Assessments—70 Documented Strikes:
The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs references an official legal registry detailing more than 70 distinct artillery bombardments hitting populated non-military zones.
Infrastructure Mapping:
To satisfy the charge of “using prohibited means and methods of warfare,” Russian authorities submit municipal real-estate damage reports, photographs of destroyed homes, and utility damage assessments from the Donbas as physical proof of non-military targeting.
4. Casualty Testimony and Medical Records /154 Victim Dossiers:
Russian law enforcement maintains a database of 154 specific civilian casualties (including both fatalities and injuries) recorded during his periods of regional command.
Witness Depositions:
The Investigative Committee incorporates formal depositions and video testimonies from local Donbas residents, as well as coroner reports and hospital treatment records, using them in court to legally link civilian suffering to the timeline of Drapatyi’s artillery deployments.
Criminal Database Listing:
Based on these claims of indiscriminate violence, the Russian Interior Ministry officially placed Drapatyi on its federal wanted list immediately following his mid-2026 promotion.
Assessments of Incompetence vs. Capability
Varying Blogger Perspectives:
Unlike the unified stance on his alleged cruelty, Russian military analysts and bloggers express divided views on his competence.
The “Soviet Style” Critique:
Some commentators attempt to downplay his operational capability by grouping him with a broader critique of Ukraine’s command structure, labeling it as rigid or incapable of shifting away from outdated Soviet tactical dogmas, despite propaganda claiming the opposite.
Warnings of Battlefield Danger:
Conversely, prominent Russian war bloggers (such as the author of Zapiski Veterana) openly challenge the narrative of incompetence.
They warn domestic audiences that Drapatyi is a highly energetic, dangerous, and adaptive battlefield commander who gained his career advancement directly through active combat conditions rather than peacetime politics.
The Loss of Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk)
Failure to Hold the City: Russian outlets focus heavily on Drapatyi’s failure to maintain control over the strategically vital city of Pokrovsk (referred to by Russian sources by its Soviet name, Krasnoarmeysk).
December 2025 Defeat: Reports from Russian state media emphasize that despite his tactical efforts to anchor the defense, Russian forces successfully “liberated” the city on December 1, 2025.
High Attrition: Russian military bloggers frequently highlight that Ukrainian forces suffered massive personnel and equipment casualties during the Pokrovsk defense under his guidance.
Accusations of “Meat Assault” Tactics / Costly Frontline Orders: Russia media have dubbed Drapatyi a “failure-prone general,” arguing that his tactical playbook relies on sending waves of troops into unsustainable defensive positions.
Inability to Halt Advances: Russian military analysts argue that his reliance on high-casualty counter-attacks ultimately failed to stop the steady momentum of the Russian army’s offensive across the Donetsk region.
Notable Failures
The Kharkiv Sector Retreats (Autumn 2025)
When Drapatyi was appointed to head the Kharkiv sector in October 2025, pro-Kremlin commentators claimed his deployment was an operational failure from the start.
Territorial Losses: While Ukrainian sources framed his mission as a stabilization effort, Russian mil-bloggers argued that forces under his command failed to hold vital border fortifications, allowing Russian troops to steadily push deeper into the “grey zone” and secure tactical positions across northern Kharkiv Oblast
The Dnipropetrovsk Assembly Disasters: During his tenure as commander of the Ground Forces, Russian state media heavily weaponized two separate, devastating Russian ballistic missile strikes on Ukrainian training grounds in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
Failure of Operational Security: Russian military analysts blamed Drapatyi directly for a massive failure in operational security, claiming he allowed large concentrations of troops to assemble in the open. The catastrophic strikes, which killed at least 12 soldiers and wounded over 60 in June 2025, forced him to publicly offer his resignation. Russian outlets framed this not as accountability, but as an admission of severe administrative incompetence.
Exhaustion of the Khortytsia Strategic Reserve: Russian war correspondents report that while commanding the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group, Drapatyi repeatedly failed to stabilize flanking operations around Toretsk and the Siversk protrusion.
Squandering Matériel: Telegram channels claim that his doctrine of launching localized, high-casualty infantry counter-attacks failed to plug frontline gaps and instead rapidly depleted Ukraine’s limited armored reserves and elite personnel.
Overextension of the Southern Lines (Early 2024): While Drapatyi initially received credit for his role in the 2022 Kherson counteroffensive, Russian military bloggers argue that his subsequent defensive deployments in the south during 2024 were a failure. They claim his inability to establish deep, layered fortifications allowed Russian forces to systematically roll back Ukrainian gains on the left bank of the Dnipro River, rendering previous Ukrainian sacrifices meaningless.
Anticipation of a Failed Summer Offensive:
The “Scapegoat” Narrative: Russian war correspondents, such as Alexander Sladkov, note that Drapatyi’s recent assignment to lead the Khortytsia operational grouping in the Donbas places him in an impossible position. Russian analytical outlets, such as Voennoedelo, explicitly state that Drapatyi is being positioned to become the ultimate “scapegoat” for the Ukrainian army’s systemic failures. By appointing a general who was actively demanded and cheered by the public and frontline soldiers, Zelensky ensures that any future territorial losses or failed operations will be blamed on the general’s strategy, rather than the president’s political directives.
Premature Claims of Success: Russian media frames recent Ukrainian tactical actions in the Donbas “grey zone” as heavily overblown failures. They argue that political factions in Kyiv are setting Drapatyi up to take the blame for broader systemic military failures in the east.
From the perspective of Russian state media, geopolitical analysts, and pro-war military commentators, Volodymyr Zelensky will utilize a potential failure by Mykhailo Drapatyi as a political shield to deflect blame, manage public unrest, and consolidate his personal control over the state apparatus. Following Drapatyi’s July 2026 promotion amidst massive domestic protests, Russian sources argue that Zelensky has structured the appointment to yield specific political advantages if the battlefield situation worsens.
Absolving the Political Leadership:
Russian war correspondents argue that if the front lines collapse further, Zelensky will frame the defeat as an operational failure by the military high command. This allows the presidential administration to distance itself from unpopular battlefield outcomes.
Russian media notes that Drapatyi was appointed to pacify a dangerous domestic political crisis. If he fails, the presidential administration can argue to the public that street protests and demanding leadership changes during wartime only disrupt the front, thereby discouraging future public demonstrations.
A failure by Drapatyi would provide an immediate pretext for another sweeping purge of the General Staff, allowing Zelensky to place hyper-loyalists in charge of defense ministry spending and Western financial aid flows.