Cuban Missile Crisis

President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962 was a critical point in the Cold War. American spy planes discovered the Soviets had installed missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba with enough range and power to destroy much of the southeastern U.S. President John F. Kennedy was advised to send in the military to take out the missiles, but instead demanded that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) remove them. A naval blockade around Cuba guaranteed no more missiles would enter. After a few tense days a compromise was reached. The Soviets publicly removed all the missiles, the U.S. promised never to invade Cuba, and (secretly) the U.S. removed similar American missiles that had recently been installed in Turkey, near the Soviet border.

The Cubans refer to the "October Crisis," while the Soviets called it "the Caribbean crisis." This naming highlights three different views: (1) The Cubans see this as one of many crises; (2) The Soviets view it as a confrontation that took place in the Caribbean (thus deemphasizing Cuba's importance); and (3) the United States perceives this as a multidimensional time bomb with international consequences including the future of Berlin.

Origins

Frustrated by the rearmament of West Germany and the success of NATO, the Kremlin concocted a new strategy in the early 1960s in its quest to help capitalism self-destruct: encourage civil wars of "national liberation" in the third world. The Communist logic, following Lenin, was that the economic health of capitalism depended on its exploitation of the wealth of the Third World. Without that exploitation capitalism would finally collapse. Russia would give military and diplomatic support to anti-colonial, anti-capitalist pro- Communist movements. The new slogan of the left across the globe was that America--run by and for the benefit of giant corporations--had succeeded fascism as most dangerous agent of imperialism. Moscow's recent break with Beijing meant that it had to compete for influence among leftists: the winner would be the one seen as more anti-American. Third world proxy operations appeared to be much cheaper and safer than direct confrontation with NATO.

Cuba

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's first important opportunity to employ the strategy came in 1962, when the US seemed on the verge of rolling back the first pro-Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba. Fidel Castro rubbed Americans the wrong way. In the first months after the bearded guerrilla captain came to power in 1959, Washington was willing to overlook reports that he was a true Marxist-Leninist, not merely some agrarian reformer. By 1960 Cuba had become a Soviet satellite; presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower planned and President John F. Kennedy ordered the CIA to destabilize his regime. In April, 1961, 1,400 Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs, expecting the populace would rise up and throw out Castro's dictatorship. The exiles were armed, trained and directed by the CIA. Kennedy allowed the CIA to make one attack on Castro's small air force, but inexplicably canceled the necessary second strike. The invasion immediately came to grief; the exiles became prisoners (later they were ransomed in exchange for medicines.) Embarrassed, Kennedy cut off dollar trade with Cuba, while the CIA stepped up its sabotage; rumors abounded about a new invasion, this time by the Marines. The rumors were in fact disinformation designed to frighten and weaken Castro. The economic blockade tightened.

As a loyal Democrat who had learned the "lesson" of Korea, Kennedy believed in the containment strategy, and rejected rollback. Furthermore the Bay of Pigs fiasco had taught the young president a bitter lesson: no matter how much he personally empathized with the sufferings of the Cuban people (who were fellow Catholics), he needed to act in terms of a cold-blooded analysis of the American national interest. The CIA threats were not a prelude to rollback but a substitute.

Possible range of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba

Havana and Moscow

Military aid

Since 1960 the Soviets had sent over $250 million worth of war matériel to Cuba, including 394 tanks and self-propelled weapons, 888 automatic and antiaircraft guns, 41 warplanes, 13 ships, 13 radio locators, 308 radio sets, and 3,619 trucks and tractors. The Soviets also provided technical training for Cuban crews including 300 crews for tanks and self-propelled weapons, 130 crews for artillery batteries, 20 crews of defensive artillery batteries, 42 pilots for the MiG-15, and 5 pilots for the fighter MiG-19A. Another 107 Cuban pilots and 618 sailors had been trained in Soviet military schools; meanwhile, 178 Cuban military specialists—including 62 pilots, 55 tankers, and 61 artillery technicians—had been trained in Czechoslovakia. Obviously it was far too little to defeat an American invasion that seemed imminent.

Sending nuclear weapons

Havana and Moscow, however, were fearful. Without consulting his strategists, Khrushchev personally concocted a reckless scheme; Cuban leaders, terrified for their own safety, eagerly accepted it. The weapons were to remain under Soviet, not Cuban, control. Fidel Castro rejected warnings that acceptance of the missiles would make Cuba a helpless pawn of the Kremlin, and he ordered his intelligence agencies to stop studying the matter. Beginning in July, 1962, Khrushchev sent in 70 ships loaded with a billion dollars' worth of munitions--including 42 IL-28 nuclear bombers (without the bombs), 24 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile complexes [SAM], and 42,000 troops. Most ominously, he delivered 42 medium-range (1100 mile) SS-4 ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with nuclear warheads, and began loading 24 intermediate-range (2200 miles) SS-5 IRBMs. They could hurl H-bombs to any target from Washington to the Panama Canal. Besides deterring an invasion, they would help redress NATO's lead in strategic weapons; above all the missiles on America's doorstep would enhance Soviet prestige across the world.

Intelligence failure and response

Kennedy believed Soviet assurances that there were no missiles--and warned Moscow there had better be none. A breakdown in data gathering prevented the CIA from convincingly refuting Moscow's cover story. An off-year election campaign was underway, and the White House loudly denied charges by Republican Senator Kenneth Keating from New York that the Soviets were installing nuclear weapons in Cuba to threaten the U.S. and Kennedy was covering it up. The missiles were discovered by a lone U-2 reconnaissance plane on October 14. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable.

Although the president and his brother Robert Kennedy (1925-68), the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General Maxwell Taylor (1901-87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary Paul Nitze was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing.

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) met regularly before the crisis. At its critical September 19, 1962, meeting it decided that the intelligence contained no evidence that the Soviets had sent nuclear missiles to Cuba, and it unanimously concluded that on balance they would not do so in the future. Kennedy trusted the USIB and repeatedly denied there were Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. There is no evidence, Kennedy insisted, "of any significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance."

Intelligence photo showing Soviet IRBM missile site in Guanajay Cuba Oct 23 1962

High-altitude U-2 aircraft flown by the United States Air Force, took photographs that were analyzed by the National Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), a joint CIA-military analytic group. They showed missiles. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable. Although the president and his brother Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General Maxwell Taylor (1901-87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary Paul Nitze was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing.

The U.S. could tolerate a gradual evening out of the strategic balance if it took several years and so permitted political adjustments as it proceeded and at least tacit understandings, if not formal ones, on a whole range of matters including arms control. What Washington could not accept was a swift, sudden, and secret shift in the strategic equation by using a new threat of nuclear weapons that would cause massive political and diplomatic upheaval.

Photography

An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.

Many rumors of missiles in Cuba were offered to the US Government by Cuban exiles and former residents. However, these reports were potentially of such importance that they required unequivocal verification before action could be taken, Photography was essential in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the U-2, or Utility 2.

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.

Photographic Interpretation

After a U-2 Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the CIA was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.

Low Level Photography

Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk. No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

Missiles

At the time, Moscow had only a few intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the US from Soviet launch pads, plus 150 long-range bombers. By contrast America had far more weapons capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 200 ICBMs (126 Atlas, 60 Titan I, and 20 solid-fueled Minuteman I), plus 2,000 B-47 medium and B-52 long-range bombers; the Navy had 144 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). In early 1962, an Air Force squadron of 15 Jupiter medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) became operational in Turkey; two squadrons were deployed in Italy but due for retirement. "They have surrounded us with bases on all sides!" grumbled Khrushchev. The ExComm heard that Jupiters were "obsolete"; lacking good military advice they concluded they were therefore worthless. The Jupiters were set up in the open and burned kerosene and liquid oxygen. All three systems were obsolescent in comparison to solid-fuel missiles that could be launched from underground silos or submarines, but all were perfectly capable of delivering 1.5 megaton warheads (one megaton = one million tons of TNT). A Jupiter on alert could be launched on 15 minutes notice; the comparableSoviet SS-4 SS-5 missiles probably needed four or five hours to launch. Missiles in Cuba could knock out much of the US bomber force, and if Kennedy permitted the first 40 to stay, Khrushchev could have shipped hundreds more.

ExComm debated four options: vigorous diplomatic protest might "talk" the missiles out. Second, a "sea" solution would blockade Cuba and squeeze them out. Third, the "air" solution (Op-Plan 3-12) would use tactical air power to shoot them out. Finally the menace could be ended once and for all by the land option. Op-Plan 3-14 would land one Marine and five Army divisions (with three more in reserve) and seize the entire island within two weeks. US casualties were predicted to be 18,000-19,000. The Joint Chiefs recommended the air solution, but ExComm perhaps misunderstood what a "surgical strike" would entail. Finally Robert Kennedy vetoed the air solution, saying it would be too much like Pearl Harbor in reverse. The sea option was chosen; it would not require any casualties, and it would block the arrival of nuclear warheads. (Unknown to Washington, 42 nuclear warheads were already in Cuba.)

The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.

Naval Quarantine

On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around Cuba, to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been said that the quarantine was meant to be a form of communication, rather than a method of eliminating the missiles, as enough had already been delivered as to cause concern to the United States.

Adlai Stevenson, and The United Nations

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States made efforts to gain international support, through organizations such as the Organization of American States, and the United Nations.

During the heat of the Crisis, Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Zorin in the United Nations, with the following statement:

"Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?... Don't wait for the translation! Yes or no?" Zorin responded, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does-" Stevenson interrupted and said, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.... I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room."

The United States followed up by publicly showing the U-2 photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist.

Soviet Missiles in Cuba

A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.

Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the SS-4 "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.

However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the SS-5 "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA.

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying U-2. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.

U-2 Shot Down

File:R Anderson.jpg

Major Rudolph Anderson.

Despite the fact that negotiations between both countries didn’t appear to be favorable, and that missiles were becoming extremely close to being active, there was no advancement by either party, for a time. On October 27, 1962, Major Rudolph Anderson began a routine U-2 photographic mission over Cuba. Similar missions had been flown successfully in the past few days, without any unusual activity. This time however, a Soviet SA-2 SAM Site fired upon Maj. Anderson, destroying the aircraft.

When word reached Washington D.C., many on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. No action was taken due to President Kennedy's expressed desire to wait and communicate with the Soviet government. This incident was a dangerous move in the crisis, which caused additional difficulties in negotiations between countries.

(Note: Different sources have printed that Fidel Castro had been the individual to launch upon Major Anderson, but these rumors have been dismissed by many US government officials of that time. It is most likely that the decision was made by the Soviet Commander located in Cuba, though the justification is not fully known.)

Final Negotiations

The United States had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the United States Air Force would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between Washington D.C. and Moscow, the United States prepared it's final offer. Attorney General Robert Kennedy payed a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in Turkey, both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with NATO agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over.

Soviet military doctrine

In the post-Stalin era, the Soviet military regained ascendancy in the Communist ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the Politburo with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the KGB. The Soviet military is composed of five branches which includes the Strategic Rocket Forces who controlled nuclear weapons. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other NATO allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the Cold War, both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.

Further reading

• The Cuban Missile Crisis, Ray S. Cline, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1989.
• Thirteen Days - Robert F. Kennedy
• Eyeball To Eyeball - Dino Brugioni
• The Kennedy Tapes - Ernest May & Phillip Zelikow