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→Russia-Ukraine war
Responding to comments Johnson made about [[German]] support for the NATO war in Ukraine, chancellor [[Olaf Scholz]] said of Johnson, "We know that the very entertaining former prime minister always has his own relationship to the truth."<ref>https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/germany-boris-johnson-cnn-moscow-prime-minister-b1042114.html</ref>
Responding to comments Johnson made about [[German]] support for the NATO war in Ukraine, chancellor [[Olaf Scholz]] said of Johnson, "We know that the very entertaining former prime minister always has his own relationship to the truth."<ref>https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/germany-boris-johnson-cnn-moscow-prime-minister-b1042114.html</ref>
===''WaPo'' blames US & UK planning for Ukraine's defeat===
In December 2023 the ''Washington Post'' released a two-article series, ''Miscalculations, Divisions Marked Offensive Planning By U.S., Ukraine'' and ''In Ukraine, A War Of Incremental Gains As Counteroffensive Stalls''. It dispenses equal blame on the US and UIK planning of the whole mess and the Ukrainian execution of it:<ref>[https://www.moonofalabama.org/2023/12/the-war-in-ukraine-is-done.html The War In Ukraine Is Done], Moon of Alabama, December 05, 2023. moonofalabama.org</ref>
{{quotebox-float|'''Miscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by U.S., Ukraine'''
Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan. But [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] miscalculated the extent to which Ukraine’s forces could be transformed into a [[Western alliance|Western-style fighting force]] in a short period — especially without giving Kyiv air power integral to modern militaries.
U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over [[strategy]], [[tactics]] and timing. The [[Pentagon]] wanted the assault to begin in mid-April [2023] to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional [[weapon]]s and training.
U.S. military officials were confident that a mechanized frontal attack on Russian lines was feasible with the troops and weapons that Ukraine had. The simulations concluded that Kyiv’s forces, in the best case, could reach the [[Sea of Azov]] and cut off Russian troops in the south in 60 to 90 days.
The United States advocated a focused assault along that southern axis, but Ukraine’s leadership believed its forces had to attack at three distinct points along the 600-mile front, southward toward both Melitopol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov and east toward the embattled city of [[Bakhmut]].
The [[U.S. intelligence community]] had a more downbeat view than the U.S. [[military]], assessing that the offensive had only a 50-50 chance of success given the stout, multilayered defenses Russia had built up over the winter and spring.
[...]
As the expected launch of the offensive approached, Ukrainian military officials feared they would suffer catastrophic losses — while American officials believed the toll would ultimately be higher without a decisive assault.}}
And from the second part:
{{quotebox-float|'''In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls'''
Seventy percent of troops in one of the brigades leading the counteroffensive, and equipped with the newest Western weapons, entered battle with no [[combat]] experience.
Ukraine’s setbacks on the battlefield led to rifts with the [[United States]] over how best to cut through deep Russian defenses.
The commander of U.S. forces in Europe couldn’t get in touch with Ukraine’s top commander for weeks in the early part of the campaign amid tension over the [[American]]’s second-guessing of battlefield decisions.
Each side blamed the other for mistakes or miscalculations. U.S. military officials concluded that Ukraine had fallen short in basic military tactics, including the use of ground reconnaissance to understand the density of minefields. Ukrainian officials said the Americans didn’t seem to comprehend how attack drones and other [[technology]] had transformed the battlefield.}}
===Foreign policy===
===Foreign policy===