| | [[Communist Party USA]] (CPUSA) had always received directives and funds from the [[Soviet Union]] via courier. Moscow's most effective control had been through [[Comintern]] representatives.<ref>Louis Budenz, ''Men Without Faces: The Communist Conspiracy in the USA,'' Harper and Brothers, New York, 1948, pp. 4-5, 55, 68-69, 78-81. [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?page=usercat&catid=8&count=1 pp.15-16, 66, 79-80, 89-92 pdf]</ref> | | [[Communist Party USA]] (CPUSA) had always received directives and funds from the [[Soviet Union]] via courier. Moscow's most effective control had been through [[Comintern]] representatives.<ref>Louis Budenz, ''Men Without Faces: The Communist Conspiracy in the USA,'' Harper and Brothers, New York, 1948, pp. 4-5, 55, 68-69, 78-81. [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?page=usercat&catid=8&count=1 pp.15-16, 66, 79-80, 89-92 pdf]</ref> |
| − | [[Earl Browder]] accepted the [[Hitler-Stalin pact]] of August 1939 without hesitation. Comintern did find it necessary to fine-tune the CPUSA's stance. Immediately after the Pact, [[Georgi Dimitrov]], chief of the Comintern, sent a ciphered message to Browder explaining that the CPUSA's line supporting the Pact was not fully correct because while it broke with President [[Franklin Roosevelt]]’s policy of supporting Britain, France, and [[Lend-Lease]] aid, it failed to take the additional step of breaking with FDR's domestic policies as well. Browder and the CPUSA immediately made the required changes in its policies, and in 1940 the CPUSA did it's best to oppose FDR's reelection to the presidency.<ref>Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Kyrill M. Anderson, ''The Soviet World of American Communism,'' New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, pp. 71–84.</ref> | + | [[Earl Browder]] accepted the [[Hitler-Stalin pact]] of August 1939 without hesitation. Comintern did find it necessary to fine-tune the CPUSA's stance. Immediately after the Pact, [[Georgi Dimitrov]], chief of the Comintern, sent a ciphered message to Browder explaining that the CPUSA's line supporting the Pact was not fully correct because while it broke with President [[Franklin Roosevelt]]’s policy of supporting Britain, France, and [[Lend-Lease]] aid, it failed to take the additional step of breaking with FDR's domestic policies as well. Browder and the CPUSA immediately made the required changes in its policies, and in 1940 the CPUSA did it's best to oppose FDR's reelection to the presidency.<ref>Harvey Klehr, [[John Earl Haynes]], and Kyrill M. Anderson, ''The Soviet World of American Communism,'' New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, pp. 71–84.</ref> |
| | [[World War II]] reduced the direct organization ties of CPUSA to Comintern and drastically reduced the volume of communications. Postal communications was less reliable and often delayed and subject to government inspection. International cable traffic was routinely reviewed by war-time security officials. Travel to the USSR became increasingly difficult. In 1940 the Voorhis Act was passed imposing regulatory requirements on domestic American organizations with foreign government ties. To avoid the Voorhis Act, in November 1940, CPUSA, with Comintern permission, severed its official membership in the Communist International, and the last officially designated CPUSA representative in Moscow left in 1941.<ref>Klehr, Haynes, and Anderson, The Soviet World, pp. 87–88.</ref> | | [[World War II]] reduced the direct organization ties of CPUSA to Comintern and drastically reduced the volume of communications. Postal communications was less reliable and often delayed and subject to government inspection. International cable traffic was routinely reviewed by war-time security officials. Travel to the USSR became increasingly difficult. In 1940 the Voorhis Act was passed imposing regulatory requirements on domestic American organizations with foreign government ties. To avoid the Voorhis Act, in November 1940, CPUSA, with Comintern permission, severed its official membership in the Communist International, and the last officially designated CPUSA representative in Moscow left in 1941.<ref>Klehr, Haynes, and Anderson, The Soviet World, pp. 87–88.</ref> |